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ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION 
OF PROPERTY IN CHILE 
M.C. Mirow*
 
 
One may say that in fact the concept of property as a subjective right 
disappears, to be replaced by the concept of property as a social function. 
                                                            Professor Léon Duguit, 19231
One may say that in fact the concept of property as a subjective right 
disappears, to be replaced by the concept of property as a social function. 
 
                                                   President Arturo Alessandri, 19252
INTRODUCTION 
 
These identical passages indicate the influence that the thought of Léon 
Duguit had on President Alessandri as he guided the drafting of the Chilean 
Constitution of 1925 and its provision on property.  Since the 1920s, 
numerous countries in Latin America have promulgated constitutions that 
adopt a definition of property that incorporates a social function or social 
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 1. “On peut dire qu’en fait la conception de la propriété droit subjectif disparaît pour 
faire place à la conception de la propriété fonction sociale.” 3 LÉON DUGUIT, TRAITE DE 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 618 (2d ed. 1923). 
 2. “Se puede decir que en el hecho el concepto de la propiedad como derecho subjetivo 
desaparece, para ser reemplazado por el concepto de la propiedad como función social.” 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, ACTAS OFICIALES DE LAS SESIONES CELEBRADAS POR LA COMISIÓN 
Y SUBCOMISIONES ENCARGADAS DEL ESTUDIO DEL PROYECTO DE NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 116 (1925) [hereinafter ACTAS] (citing Léon Duguit, as 
emphasized in the reported text). 
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obligation norm.3  Scholars familiar with the sweeping social legislation of 
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 have speculated that it served as the 
intellectual source for other Latin American constitutions that define 
property in terms of a social function.4  In fact, the origin of these 
provisions in the Southern Cone was not an intellectual imposition from the 
North, in this case Mexico, but rather was the product of the transmission of 
European, notably French, ideas about the social function of property.  The 
main source of these ideas was Duguit, a law professor from Bordeaux, 
who wrote and lectured extensively on law and constitutional theory in the 
early 1900s.5
 
 3. See M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW:  A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 205 (2004). 
  Duguit’s lectures in Buenos Aires in 1911 and their 
 4. For example, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 was aimed squarely at 
the expropriation of large estates and at mining companies who owned subsoil rights.  It led 
the way to widespread agrarian reform in Mexico. See GUILLERMO FLORIS MARGADANT S., 
INTRODUCCION A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO MEXICANO 194, 197 (1990); see, e.g., David S. 
Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
405, 415 (1975) (noting the importance of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 in the region’s 
constitutional development and its adoption of the “concept that private property must serve 
a social function”).  Clark, however, does not jump to the conclusion that the Mexican 
Constitution directly influenced the Chilean Constitution on this point.  Thomas Ankersen 
and Thomas Ruppert imply a closer causal relationship between Mexico and the other 
countries of Latin America adopting social function language. Thomas T. Ankersen & 
Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad:  The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in 
Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 95–96 (2006) (“In Latin America, the Mexican 
Revolution coincided with this era and its 1917 constitution . . . represents the world’s first 
example of what has been called ‘social constitutionalism.’  Following Mexico, other states 
in Europe and Latin America explicitly incorporated the Duguitian idea of social function in 
their constitutions.”).  Mexico is “where the Social Function Doctrine has its Latin American 
roots.” Id. at 116.  Ankersen and Ruppert are incorrect when they speculate that the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 “did not use the phrase ‘social function’ since it was not until two years 
later, in 1919, did Léon Duguit use the term in his writing.” Id. at 101 n.190; see M.C. 
Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property:  Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 191, 199 (2010).  There is even mention of a Spanish translation of Duguit’s LES 
TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON from Madrid in 
1915. Charles A. Hale, The Civil Law Tradition and Constitutionalism in Twentieth-Century 
Mexico:  The Legacy of Emilio Rabasa, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 257, 276 n.45 (2000).  
Abelardo Levaggi notes a Spanish translation from 1912. Abelardo Levaggi, Catedráticos 
Europeos en la Facultad de Derecho Alrededor del Centenario 17 n.65 (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  For a discussion of Spanish editions of 
Duguit’s work, including mention of a Spanish edition of LES TRANSFORMATIONS 
GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON, see Tomás-Ramón Fernandez, 
Duguit lu, l’Espagne, in AUTOUR DE LÉON DUGUIT:  COLLOQUE COMMÉMORATIF DU 150E 
ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA NAISSANCE DU DOYEN LÉON DUGUIT, BORDEAUX, 29–30 MAI 2009, at 
255–63 (Fabrice Melleray ed., 2011) [hereinafter AUTOUR DE LÉON DUGUIT].  The reason for 
Mexico not adopting this phrase in this constitution must lie elsewhere, perhaps even in the 
mere unavailability of Duguit’s work.  Indeed, even after the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 
Mexico was subject to European thought on socializing its law. See José Ramón Narváez 
Hernández, El Código Privado-Social:  Influencia de Francesco Cosentini en el Código 
Civil Mexicano de 1928, 16 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 201, 201–26 
(2004) (Mex.); Juan Carlos Marín G., Ochenta años desde la publicación del Código Civil 
del Distrito Federal:  un Código privado-social (1928–2008) (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 5. See DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES JURISTES FRANÇAIS (XIIE-XXE SIÈCLE), at 271–72 
(Patrick Arabeyre et al. eds., 2007); José Luis Monereo Pérez & José Calvo Gonzáles, Léon 
Duguit (1859–1928):  Jurista de una Sociedad en Transformación, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO 
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subsequent publication are the earliest structured exposition of the social 
function of property.6  These lectures spread the idea of the social function 
of property to many areas of the world and they produced direct effects in 
the Southern Cone.  In 1925, Chile was one of the first countries in Latin 
America to adopt a social function limitation on property.7
This Article traces the importance of Duguit’s work in the construction of 
the property provisions of the Chilean Constitution of 1925.  It concludes 
that Duguit was the most important source for the idea of the social function 
of property in Chile.  From the moment of its introduction into Chile, 
Duguit’s terminology was appropriated and expanded beyond its original 
scope for political purposes.  This redefinition of the social function of 
property continued throughout the Chilean use of the term in the twentieth 
century and was used for political ends by leaders as diverse as Salvador 
Allende and Augusto Pinochet.
 
8
 
CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483, 483–85 (2005) (Spain). See generally AUTOUR DE LÉON 
DUGUIT, supra note 
 
4.  Others have noted, in passing, the influence of Léon Duguit on 
President Alessandri. See, e.g., Joseph R. Thome, Land Rights and Agrarian Reform:  Latin 
American and South African Perspectives, in GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LAW 201, 209 (Julio 
Faundez ed., 1997). 
 6. Duguit developed the idea of the social function of property from a number of 
French antiformalist thinkers who advanced the field of sociological jurisprudence.  He 
borrowed substantially from the work of French doctoral student Henri Hayem. See Mirow, 
supra note 4, at 216–19.  Duguit came to the Law Faculty of the University of Buenos Aires 
as part of a series of invitations to European law professors to celebrate the centenary of the 
May Revolution during the first decades of the twentieth century.  Others in the series, also 
leaving their mark on Argentine law, were Italian penalist Enrico Ferri, Spanish legal 
historian Rafael Altamira y Crevea, and Spanish public law specialist Adolfo Posada. 
Levaggi, supra note 4, at 1.  For Duguit’s influence in the United States, see Carol Harlow, 
The Influence of Léon Duguit on Anglo-American Legal Thought, in AUTOUR DE LÉON 
DUGUIT, supra note 4, at 227–54; Mirow, supra note 4, at 196. 
 7. Reading the text of Article 38 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1920, I disagree with 
Ankersen and Ruppert’s assessment that “[t]he Social Function Doctrine first appeared in 
Peru’s 1920 constitution, and was maintained in its 1933 Constitution.” Ankersen & 
Ruppert, supra note 4, at 115.  The provision from 1920 states, “Property is inviolable, 
whether it is material, intellectual, literary or artistic.” (“La propiedad es inviolable bien sea 
material, intelectual, literaria o artística.”). CONSTITUCIÓN PARA LA REPÚBLICA DEL PERÚ 
(1920) art. 38.  This guarantee is followed by standard language concerning expropriation. 
See id.  I agree that the Peruvian Constitution of 1933 contains a clear adoption of the social 
function of property in its Article 34:  “Property ought to be used in harmony with the social 
interest.  The law shall fix the limits and extent of the right of property.” (“La propiedad 
debe usarse en armonía con el interés social.  La ley fijará los límites y modalidades del 
derecho de propiedad.”). CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ (1933) art. 34.  The Ecuadorian 
Constitution of 1929 is another early example.  Article 151(14) of this constitution reads that 
it protects “[t]he right of property with the restrictions that necessity and social progress 
require.” (“El derecho de propiedad, con las restricciones que exijan las necesidades y el 
progreso sociales.”). CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR (1929) art. 
151(14).  For the social function in Colombia’s Constitution of 1936 and later developments, 
see David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization:  An Inquiry into the 
Magnitude of Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at 83, 
91–99. 
 8. Similar contradictory or politically self-serving definitions of the social function of 
property in other countries of Latin America may be noted in Daniel Bonilla, Liberalism and 
Property in Colombia:  Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1135 (2011). 
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I.  CHILEAN POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1925 
The constitutional perceptions of property experienced a profound shift 
from the beginning of the Republic in the early nineteenth century to the 
early decades of the twentieth century.  The Chilean Constitution of 1833 
provided a classically liberal conception of inviolable private property.  
Under the Constitution of 1833, the state could only take property for a 
public purpose and with prior just indemnification.9  Perceptions of 
property had changed drastically by 1925 when the Chilean Constitution 
was debated and promulgated.  While repeating the guarantees of private 
property, new language in the constitution submits property to “the 
maintenance and progress of the social order.”10
In many ways, the debate over the social function norm of property was 
only one instance of both regional and global trends towards “The Social” 
in law and legal thought in this period.
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 9. The relevant provision from the Constitution of 1833 reads: 
  These issues found full expression 
in Chilean politics and the country’s attempt to describe property on a 
constitutional level.  Indeed, the debate over the social function of property 
  Artículo 12.  La Constitución asegura a todos los habitantes de la República: 
  . . . . 
  (5) La inviolabilidad de todas las propiedades, sin distinción de las que 
pertenezcan a particulares o comunidades, i sin que nadie pueda ser privado de la 
de su dominio, ni de una parte de ella por pequeña que sea, o del derecho que a 
ella tuviere, sino en virtud de sentencia judicial; salvo el caso en que la utilidad 
del Estado, calificada por una lei, exija el uso o enajenación de alguna; lo que 
tendrá lugar dándose previamente al dueño la indemnización que se ajustare con 
él, o se avaluare a juicio de hombres buenos . . . . 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE (1833) art. 12(5).  For a translation of 
the text into English, see infra text accompanying note 47. 
 10. The text from the Constitution of 1925 reads: 
  Artículo 10.  La Constitucion asegura a todos los habitantes de la República: 
  . . . . 
  (10) La inviolabilidad de todas las propiedades, sin distincion alguna. 
  Nadie puede ser privado de la de su dominio, ni de una parte de ella, o del 
derecho que a ella tuviere, sino en virtud de sentencia judicial o de espropiacion 
por razon de utilidad pública, calificada por una lei.  En este caso, se dará 
previamente al dueño la indemnización que se ajuste con él o que se determine en 
el juicio correspondiente. 
  El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad está sometido a las limitaciones o reglas 
que exijan el mantenimiento y el progreso del órden social, y, en tal sentido, podrá 
la ley imponerle obligaciones o servidumbres de utilidad pública en favor de los 
intereses generales del Estado, de la salud de los ciudadanos y de la salubridad 
pública . . . . 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE (1925) art. 10(10).  Later developments 
in Chile led to an even stronger assertion of the social function of property. See 
CONSTITUTICIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(24).  For the text of 
Article 19(24) of the 1980 Chilean Constitution, see infra note 230. 
 11. Mario Diaz Cruz, Rule of Law—Quo Vadis?  Vim Vi Repellere Licet, 5 COMP. JURID. 
REV. 249, 256–266 (1968); Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought:  
1850–1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 648–74 (2003); Farid Lekéal, Entre droit civil et 
droit social:  antimonie ou complémentarité? Quelques décennies d’incertitudes, 88 REVUE 
HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 523, 523–61 (2010) (Fr.); Moises Poblete 
Troncoso, The Social Content of Latin American Constitutions, 21 SOC. FORCES 100, 101–02 
(1942–1943) (surveying limitations on latifundias and uncultivated lands in Latin American 
constitutions). 
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was one of the primary battlegrounds in an ideological war over the 
political direction of the entire country.  Three major aspects guided 
political development in Chile during the decades leading to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1925.  First, electoral reforms led to a 
parliamentary form of government that produced a period of political 
stalemates and ministerial intransigence.  Second, workers organized and 
created effective unions and a new class mentality.  Third, the military 
intervened in the political process and President Alessandri was both ousted 
and returned to power through military force in a short period. 
Electoral reforms in 1891 led to a parliamentary system of democracy in 
which the president and the ministers were elected through a parliamentary 
majority.  With stronger power in the Congress, this parliamentary system 
often replaced ministers and no particular minister could expect to stay in 
office more than a year.12  One scholar has noted that during this 
parliamentary period, “congress forced an average of twenty ministerial 
changes per president.”13  This uncertainty in the political leadership of the 
country was accompanied by party empowerment and entrenchment 
resulting in one group of parties known as the “Coalition,” led by the 
Conservatives, and another group of parties known as the “Alliance,” led by 
the Radicals.14  Between the Radicals on the left and the Conservatives on 
the right, the Liberal Party took something of a middle position during the 
period.  While the Conservatives apparently avoided any substantial 
splintering, the Radical party produced offshoots:  Democrats in the 1890s, 
Socialist Workers in the 1910s, and Communists in the 1920s.  In similar 
fashion, the Liberal party produced the Liberal Democrat party in the 
1890s.15
This was also a period of substantial labor and social unrest.  Unions of 
workers gained strength and effectively went on strike to gain concessions 
from management.
 
16  Strikes or protests over prices sometimes became 
violent and at times the military needed to step in to subdue them.17  
Deadlocked in its own internal political squabbles, the parliamentary 
government remained for the most part unresponsive.18  Although parties 
representing workers increased in power during the period, Conservatives 
and their allies were effective in stalling legislation to address aspects of 
what was broadly called “the social question.”19
 
 12. JOHN L. RECTOR, THE HISTORY OF CHILE 130 (2003). 
  The underlying concerns 
of these proposals were to re-emerge in the context of the debates on the 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE, 1808–2002, at 193 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 16. Id. at 195–96. 
 17. Id. at 196. 
 18. Id. 
 19. RECTOR, supra note 12, at 131. 
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social function of property and included systems of social welfare, workers’ 
housing, and public health facilities.20
Arturo Alessandri emerged as President in 1920, after being supported by 
one of two Liberal nominating conventions.  Composed of Liberals, 
Radicals, and Democrats, the Alliance convention put Alessandri forth as a 
candidate.
 
21  The Liberal Union convention, composed of Liberals, Liberal 
Democrats, and Nationals, selected Luis Barros Borgoño.22  When the 
Conservatives joined the Liberal Union, it took on the name National Union 
to support Barros Borgoño.23  When Alessandri advanced to the presidency, 
he had been a Liberal deputy for Curicó and had been elected to the Senate 
for Tarapacá in 1915.24  His presidency brought the hope of a stronger 
executive, the promise of social reform, responsive legislation, and a new 
constitution.25  Although Conservatives in Congress effectively blocked 
these reforms, Alessandri was re-elected in 1924, but the impasse between 
President and Congress continued.26  The election in 1924 realigned 
Congress along lines more amenable to the Alliance, but in September 
1924, the military, with Conservative backing, stepped in to topple 
Alessandri’s rule and to govern Chile.27  Alessandri resigned, and a military 
and Conservative junta took control of the government.28
At the beginning of 1925, a second coup led by junior officers who were 
more politically sympathetic to Alessandri and to the middle classes took 
power, and Alessandri returned to Santiago and the presidency on March 
20, 1925.
 
29  Following his return to Chile, President Alessandri moved 
forward with his plan to address the “social question” and to draft a new 
constitution.30  The social function of property was an important issue in 
the new constitution, but it was not the only pressing issue.  Other main 
issues addressed were the structural problems resulting from the 
parliamentary system, the political stasis of the system, the socioeconomic 
aspects of Chile’s cyclical nitrate industry, the relationship between the 
church and the state, and the creation of an electoral tribunal.31
 
 20. See Kimberly Stanton, The Transformation of Political Regime:  Chile’s 1925 
Constitution 4 n.8 (Apr. 17–19, 1997) (paper delivered at meeting of the Latin American 
Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico), available at http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/
LASA97/stanton.pdf. 
  These 
various issues surrounded property and its social function. 
 21. See COLLIER & SATER, supra note 15, at 201. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 207, 209. 
 26. See id. at 209; RECTOR, supra note 12, at 131–32. 
 27. See COLLIER & SATER, supra note 15, at 209, 211. 
 28. See RECTOR, supra note 12, at 132. 
 29. See COLLIER & SATER, supra note 15, at 211–12; RECTOR, supra note 12, at 132. 
 30. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 11. 
 31. See Stanton, supra note 20, at 2–3, 12, 19. 
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II.  CONTENT OF THE DEBATES OVER THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY 
In less than three weeks after his return in March 1925, Alessandri 
appointed a commission to reform the constitution.32  This consultative 
commission grew from about 50 to about 100 members with those having 
particular party allegiances identified as follows:  26 Radicals, 16 Liberals, 
14 Conservatives, 14 Democrats, 10 Liberal Democrats, 6 Communists, and 
2 Nationals.33  Subcommittees, ranging from approximately 12 to 15 
members with President Alessandri participating and presiding, carried out 
the actual work of examining the extant constitution and suggesting reform.   
The subcommittees met regularly from April 18, 1925, to August 3, 1925, 
and 33 of the sessions were published.34  The published sessions run 
approximately 500 pages in length,35 with over 50 of these pages dedicated 
to debates concerning the social function of property.  These debates cover 
five full sessions and span about two weeks of deliberations.36
From 1833 until 1925, the constitutional status of property remained the 
same.
  The 
constitutional definition of property was one of the core areas of debate 
during the process of constitutional reform. 
37  Property under the Constitution of 1833 was inviolable, and any 
taking of property by the state required a public purpose and 
indemnification.38  This provision followed the classically liberal notions of 
property found in both the Anglo-American and Continental traditions.  It is 
a view of property enshrined in the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man,39 in the French Civil Code of 1804 (Code Napoléon),40 and in the 
writings of William Blackstone.41
 
 32. ACTAS, supra note 
  It was this concept of property that 
2, at 5.  Although a fuller constituent assembly was 
contemplated, this body never met.  Alessandri created two subcommittees.  One 
subcommittee met three times and left no records.  The other, the Subcommittee of 
Constitutional Reforms, carried out the drafting of the constitution.  It appears that this 
method of proceeding was influenced by the military. See Stanton, supra note 20, at 7–10. 
 33. See COLLIER & SATER, supra note 15, at 213 n.6. 
 34. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 81–137. 
 35. Id. at 46–527. 
 36. Id. at 81–137. 
 37. ENRIQUE EVANS DE LA CUADRA, ESTATUTO CONSTITUTIONAL DEL DERECHO DE 
PROPIEDAD EN CHILE:  LA LEY 16.615 DE 20 DE ENERO DE 1967, MODIFICATORIA DE LA 
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL ESTATO, at 11–12 (1967). 
 38. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE (1833) art. 12(5). 
 39. “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof 
except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on 
condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.” 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 17 (Fr. 1789) (translation 
obtained from YALE LAW SCHOOL, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/rightsof.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2011)). 
 40. “La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus 
absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les réglemens.” 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 544 (Fr.) (1804).  “Property is the right to enjoy and to dispose of 
things in the most absolute manner, provided that one does not undertake a usage prohibited 
by law.” JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA & M.C. MIROW, GLOBAL ISSUES IN 
PROPERTY LAW 27 (2006). 
 41. Mirow, supra note 4, at 193–95.  Chilean liberalism was informed by the liberalism 
of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 (the Constitution of Cádiz) and by French and English 
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French theorists Henri Hayem and Duguit rejected through their application 
of sociological approaches to law.42  Indeed, Duguit’s lectures in Buenos 
Aires setting out the social function of property bore the title General 
Transformations of Private Law Since the Code Napoléon.43  This title 
reveals that the French Civil Code was the starting place from which Duguit 
would chart the important changes in law, including property’s shift 
towards its social function.  On the level of Chilean civil law, the French 
Civil Code of 1804 was reflected in Andrés Bello’s Civil Code for Chile of 
1855.  Bello’s notes indicate that his Article 582 of the Chilean Civil Code 
corresponded to the French provision.44  Bello’s language is more 
elaborate, but asserts the same absolutist nature of property.  It reads:  
“Dominion (which is also called property) is the real right in a corporal 
thing to enjoy and dispose of it arbitrarily, provided it is not against a law or 
against another right.”45  This definition of property in the Chilean Civil 
Code was the same in 1925 when the constitutional definition of property 
became a subject of scrutiny.46
The Chilean Civil Code’s idea of the owner’s absolute right to use or not 
to use property was consistent with the provision on property found in the 
Chilean Constitution of 1833.  This provision on property provided the 
springboard for debates concerning the nature of property for the 
Constitution of 1925.  Article 12 of the Constitution of 1833 states: 
  Thus, until the debates concerning the 
constitutional definition of property in 1925, views on the topic had 
remained stable, and property provisions in both public and private law had 
been subject to little examination.  President Alessandri’s return and the 
constitutional convention provided the moment for property to be 
reexamined in light of recent academic work on the topic and recent 
political events around the globe. 
 The Constitution assures all inhabitants of the Republic: 
 . . . . 
 
writers. María Rosaria Stabili, Jueces y Justicia en el Chile Liberal, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO 
Y ORDEN LIBERAL:  AMÉRICA LATINA, 1850–1920, at 228 n.5 (Marcello Carmagnani coord., 
2000). 
 42. Mirow, supra note 4, at 200, 216. 
 43. LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE 
NAPOLÉON (2d ed. 1920). 
 44. CÓD. CIV. art. 582 (Chile) (1855), in 12 ANDRÉS BELLO, CÓDIGO CIVIL DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE 409 (1954). 
 45. “El dominio (que se llama también propiedad), es el derecho real en una cosa 
corporal, para gozar y disponer de ella arbitrariamente; no siendo contra ley o contra 
derecho ajeno.” Id.  For the influence of the Code Napoléon on Bello’s work in codification, 
see M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America:  Andrés Bello’s Use of the Code 
Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291 (2001). 
 46. An edition of the Chilean Civil Code estimated to be from 1920–1929 contains the 
same language for Article 582. CÓD. CIV. art. 582 (Chile) (1920–1929) in CÓDIGOS DE CHILE 
213 (Eulojio Rojas Mery ed., 1st ed. n.d.) (estimated date obtained from OCLC catalog 
entry).  The official version of the Chilean Civil Code from 1937 contains the same language 
for Article 582 with a footnote referring the reader to Art. 10(10) of the Constitution of 1925. 
CÓD. CIV. art. 582 (Chile) (1937) in CÓDIGOS DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE 80 (Edición oficial, 
Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1937). 
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 (5) The inviolability of all properties, without distinction of whether 
they belong to individuals or communities, and without which no one may 
be deprived of the property of his dominion, nor a part of it however 
small, or of the right which belongs to it, unless by virtue of judicial 
sentence; except in the case of the utility of the state, defined by statute, 
requiring the use or transfer of some of it; which will happen giving 
previously indemnity to the owner to compensate him or as valued by the 
judgment of good men.47
Thus, until the debates on property commenced on May 12, 1925, there 
was a conceptual cohesion in Chilean law concerning property as expressed 
in the Civil Code and the Constitution of 1833.
 
48
The debates shattered this conceptual uniformity.  Radicals sought to 
redefine the nature of property by appealing to the idea of property’s social 
function.
  Property was inviolable 
and subject to the arbitrary exercise of the owner.  Takings of property by 
the state had to be for a public purpose and with just compensation to the 
owner. 
49  Conservatives sought to maintain the language of the 
Constitution of 1833 by expressing their concerns about the consequences 
of a change.50  Other members of the subcommittee sought some 
compromise.  Members espousing property as a social function were 
Ramón Briones Luco (Radical), Nolasco Cárdenas (Democrat), Enrique 
Oyarzún (Radical), Manuel Hidalgo (Communist), and José Guillermo 
Guerra (Liberal Democrat).  Members seeking a middle position were  
Arturo Alessandri Palma (President), Luis Barros Borgoño (Union Liberal), 
Guillermo Edwards Matte (Union Liberal), and Eliodoro Yáñez (Alliance 
Liberal).  Members who were property absolutists were Romualdo Silva 
Cortés (Conservative), Domingo Amunátegui Solar (Alliance Liberal), and 
Francisco Vidal Garcés (Conservative).51  Over half of all members were 
aligned with the Liberal Alliance that backed President Alessandri in 
1920.52
A.  Proponents of the Social Function of Property 
 
President of the Radical Party and lawyer Ramón Briones Luco was the 
first to suggest changing the constitutional definition of property in Chile.53
 
 47. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE (1833) art. 12(5).  For the 
Spanish text, see supra note 
  
9. 
 48. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 81. 
 49. See id. at 81–137. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  Party affiliations are from Stanton, supra note 20, at 16 n.35.  For a slightly 
different division of members into reformers and non-reformers, see ENRIQUE BRAHM 
GARCÍA, PROPIEDAD SIN LIBERTAD:  CHILE 1925–1973, at 34–35 (1999).  For general 
biographical information, see JORDI FUENTES & LIA CORTES, DICCIONARIO POLITICO DE 
CHILE (1810–1966), at 74 (1967) (Briones Luco); id. at 84 (Cardenas Avendaño); id. at 368 
(Oyarzun Mondaca); id. at 237 (Hidalgo Plaza); id. at 24–27 (Alessandri Palma); id. at 56 
(Barros Borgoño); id. at 164 (Edwards Matte); id. at 527 (Yañez Ponce de Leon); id. at 465 
(Silva Cortes). 
 52. Stanton, supra note 20, at 16. 
 53. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
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His first words asserted that property had already been modified by new 
social realities and that the constitution should be changed to reflect that 
“the idea of property is a social function.”54  Briones left no doubt that his 
aim was squarely set on large estates (latifundios) and uncultivated land (la 
propiedad inculta).55  Two aspects of this attack on the absolutist definition 
of property are noteworthy.  First, Briones adopted the exact same method 
of arguing for a definition of property limited by a social function that 
Duguit had advanced.56  Duguit’s conclusion that property is a social 
function was not, for him, an assertion of a new approach or theory of 
property.  Instead, Duguit argued that through scientific observation of the 
use and function of property in society, he had discovered that property had 
indeed become a social function.  Thus, the definition was, in Duguit’s 
view, nothing more than an accurate description of what had already 
happened.57
Second, Briones saw the adoption of the social function definition as a 
way of moving against the perceived problems of large landed estates and 
uncultivated farmland.
  For both Briones and Duguit, grounding the social function of 
property as an observable fait accompli was a convenient method of 
advancing a more complicated normative project. 
58  In urging for legislation to address the problem of 
latifundios, Briones appealed to the example of rural legislation in Entre 
Ríos seeking to provide inexpensive housing in Argentina to the north of 
Buenos Aires.  In Briones’s estimation, the legislation increased property 
ownership among farmers and improved agricultural production.59
There was already an extant literature on the problems of latifundios.
 
60  
While some of the authors Duguit relied on in developing his theory of the 
social function of property saw it as a means of attacking large estates, 
Duguit claimed that the social function doctrine did not lead him to 
redistributist conclusions or class struggle analysis.61  Duguit, however, 
saw uncultivated lands as a problem requiring a solution that would put the 
common good before the exercise of property.62  Furthermore, Maurice 
Hauriou, cited by Duguit, used the term latifundia as one example of where 
property revealed its economic function in society.  Hauriou was also 
apparently not concerned about the unproductive holding of land because in 
his view, the market itself would handle unproductive property.63
 
 54. Id. 
  
Nonetheless, as a subcommittee member, Briones was able to tie a social 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mirow, supra note 4, at 208, 212, 217–18 (same observations by Henri Hayem).  
The work of Joseph Charmont seems to have been particularly influential on this point for 
Duguit. Id. at 219–20 (citing JOSEPH CHARMONT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT CIVIL 
(1912)). 
 58. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 86. 
 59. Id. at 102. 
 60. Mirow, supra note 4, at 215. 
 61. Id. at 207, 211. 
 62. Id. at 208, 215. 
 63. Id. at 215–16 (citing MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC 39 (1910)). 
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function norm of property to descriptive accuracy and expand its scope to 
attack the propriety of large landed estates and uncultivated lands. 
Enrique Oyarzún, another member of the subcommittee, supported 
Briones’s attack on latifundios, but refrained from supporting the definition 
of property as a social function.64  Oyarzún sought to distinguish between 
property as a social function and the exercise of property as a social 
function.  In this way, Oyarzún was sensitive to an original difficulty with 
the translation of Duguit’s words, “[m]ais la propriété n’est pas un droit; 
elle est une function sociale.”65  In French, propriété can mean both 
“ownership” (the exercise of property) and “property” (the thing itself).66  
Jurists have translated the French propriété to Spanish propiedad and to 
English property, when rendering terms such as “the exercise of the right of 
property” (el ejercicio del derecho de propiedad), and “ownership” would 
have been more faithful to Duguit’s meaning.67
If Briones felt he was pushing the subcommittee too far towards a new 
definition of property, his social function norm of property did not go 
nearly far enough for another speaker, Manuel Hidalgo, who lamented the 
fact that his communist ideas would not guide the meeting.  For Hidalgo, 
Briones’s social function definition represented only an “acceptable 
minimum.”
  Oyarzún correctly noted 
this distinction in his comments, but throughout the debates on the topic, 
this distinction was somewhat too subtle to be a point of real contention. 
68  Indeed, Hidalgo was the only member explicitly to deny a 
“right of property.”69  Hidalgo also equated unproductive factories to 
uncultivated lands, urging their inclusion on the list of problems to be 
addressed.70  He suggested that a social function definition of property 
would lead to a very different economic structure for Chilean society.71  He 
even argued for a definition of property that reached beyond land and took 
cognizance of work and labor as a kind of industrial property.72  He urged 
that the following language be included in the constitution:  “Property is a 
social function.  The State ought to foster an economic structure that assures 
each individual and his family what is necessary for his life and for his 
complete development.”73
 
 64. ACTAS, supra note 
  With Hidalgo’s comments, momentum was 
2, at 86. 
 65. “But property is not a right, it is a social function.” DUGUIT, supra note 43, at 21. 
 66. See EDGARD LE DOCTE, DICTIONNAIRE DE TERMES JURIDIQUES EN QUATRE LANGUES 
566–67 (1987); see also JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, HISTOIRE DE DROIT DES BIENS 341 (2008); 
OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY 1591 (Marie Hélène Corréard ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
 67. Mirow, supra note 4, at 197. 
 68. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 86. 
 69. “El señor HIDALGO (don Manuel) declara que él niega el derecho de propiedad.” Id. 
at 120. 
 70. Id. at 86. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 106. 
 73. “La propiedad es una función social.  El Estado debe atender a una organización 
económica que asegure a cada individuo y a su familia lo necesario para su vida y para su 
desarrollo integral.” Id. at 86.  This idea of property goes significantly beyond Duguit’s 
thought towards the idea of social property. See Mirow, supra note 4, at 223–25; see also 
ROBERT CASTEL & CLAUDINE HAROCHE, PROPRIÉTÉ PRIVÉE, PROPRIÉTÉ SOCIALE, PROPRIÉTÉ 
DE SOI:  ENTRETIENS SUR LA CONSTRUCTION DE L’INDIVIDU MODERNE 76–79 (2001); 
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clearly building against latifundios.  The adoption of a social function 
definition of property was an instrumental step along the way to the 
redistribution of land in Chilean society. 
José Guillermo Guerra continued the assault on latifundios.  He affirmed 
the consistent opinions of the other speakers and appealed to the social 
reforms brought about in England by Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
after World War I.  Guerra viewed these reforms as having resulted in wider 
distribution of land in smaller estates in the country.74  Guerra wanted the 
subcommittee to focus pragmatically on the problem at hand, the large 
landed estates, and he asserted that the debate over whether property was a 
social function or not was merely semantic quibbling (“un juego de 
palabras”).75  Guerra was one of the few subcommittee members to 
mention Mexico in the context of its resolution of latifundios and suggested 
that uncultivated land be taxed out of existence as the reforms of Lloyd 
George accomplished in England.76
Guerra noted that there might be inconsistencies between the protection 
of property under the Constitution of 1833 and the many limitations on 
private property that already existed under the Chilean Civil Code, such as 
servitudes, and that these limitations would not withstand present scrutiny if 
subjected to a determination of constitutionality by a court charged with 
reviewing such legislation.
 
77  He also suggested expanding the underlying 
reasons for expropriation from public utility to social utility, local interest, 
or private projects for public good, such as a road or railroad.78
The inviolability of the right of property, with the limitations established 
by law. 
  Guerra’s 
suggested provision was that the Constitution would protect: 
 In cases required by the utility of the State or social utility, a law may 
authorize the expropriation of kinds or types of certain property, the price 
of previous payment as agreed to by the owner or as determined by the 
courts. 
 
HALPÉRIN, supra note 66, at 341; Robert Castel, Emergence and Transformations of Social 
Property, 9 CONSTELLATIONS 318, 324 (2002); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
 74. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 86–87. 
 75. Id. at 87.  Similarly, Edwards Matte, when arguing for the inviolability of property, 
also found this a question of semantics. See id. at 110.  Vidal Garcés too rejected any 
distinction between property and the exercise of the right of property. See id. at 114. 
 76. See id. at 87. 
 77. See id. at 94.  A number of members of the subcommittee noted the importance of 
this new power in the judiciary to review the constitutionality of legislation.  This concern 
about the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review reveals the deep-seated belief in the 
members that the constitution would serve to guide both structural elements and individual 
rights in the Chilean government.  Alessandri also noted the importance of providing a 
definition of property in the constitution that was consistent with practice and the modern 
trend. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 56–57.  Indeed, the definition of property under the 
Constitution of 1925 was the basis for claiming the unconstitutionality of legislation before 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 58–66. 
 78. See ACTAS, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
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 Congress shall enact laws that facilitate the subdivision of real 
property and that charge special taxes on uncultivated lands.79
Guerra’s argument followed Briones and Duguit’s ideas by asserting that 
the modern conception of property had changed and that a definition of 
property as a social function was most appropriate.  He was one of the few 
members of the subcommittee to suggest that the drafters follow the 
German Constitution’s definition of property as a social function.
 
80
Similar to Guerra’s approach, comments by subcommittee member 
Nolasco Cárdenas humorously asserted that he was not against property, but 
rather so much in favor of property that he wanted everyone in Chile to 
have some.  Thus, the division of the latifundios was a necessary step.  
Guerra, like others on the subcommittee, believed that society had changed, 
and social changes had led to new ideas of distributive justice.  According 
to Cárdenas, these changes had occurred in Germany, England, France, and 
Russia.
 
81  This led to a redefinition of property as a social function.82
As expressed in the debates of the subcommittee, the Radical party and 
its allies were the principal proponents of redefining the nature of property 
in the Constitution of 1925.  Radical literature after the Constitution of 1925 
indicates that obtaining a newer, social definition of property was an 
achievement of the party.
 
83
 
 79. The Spanish language text reads: 
  For Radicals, replacing a classically liberal 
definition with one that hinged on the newer theories of the social function 
would have been a great victory in the battle between two different views of 
property from the perspective of the party.  Radicals saw a strict divide 
between a Catholic-Conservative construction of property that maintained 
absolute rights, and a modern, scientific perception that adopted the 
  5. La inviolabilidad del derecho de propiedad, con las limitaciones establecidas 
por las leyes. 
  En los casos en que lo requiera la utilidad del Estado, o la utilidad social, una 
ley podrá autorizar la expropiación de especies o cuerpos ciertos determinados, 
previo el pago del precio que se ajustare con el dueño o fuere determinado por los 
Tribunales de Justicia. 
  El Congreso dictará leyes que faciliten la subdivisión de la propiedad raíz y 
que graven con contribuciones especiales las tierras sin cultivo. 
Id. at 95. 
 80. See id.  Article 153 of the Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919, reads, in part 
“Property is guaranteed by the Constitution.  Its extent and limits are defined by the laws. . . .  
Property implies duties, and the use to which it is put should be over service to the welfare of 
all.” DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [CONSTITUTION] (1919) art. 153 (Ger.) 
(British & Foreign State Papers trans., 1919). 
 81. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 101.  The omission of Mexico is notable. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See PEDRO EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, REFORMAS RELIGIOSAS, SOCIALES, 
ELECTORALES, ECONÓMICAS Y POLÍTICAS DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN DEL AÑO 33 PROMULGADAS EL 
18 DE SEPTIEMPRE DE 1925:  EFECTOS DEL PARLAMENTARISMO EN CHILE, at 131–70 (1927).  
González García was a member of the Radical Socialist party whose doctoral dissertation at 
the University of Chile analyzed the Constitution of 1925. Pedro Eduardo González García, 
HISTORIA POLÍTICA LEGISLATIVA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE, http://historiapolitica.
bcn.cl/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Pedro_Eduardo_González_Garc%C3%ADa (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011).  The first social reform he lists for the Constitution of 1925 is the change to 
the concept of property. See GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, supra, at 131. 
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limitations on property through the social function doctrine.84  This strict 
dichotomy probably pushed both positions to extremes that were not 
inherent in the original expressions of these ideas.  While anti-clericalism 
was most certainly a part of the Radical position, Catholic social thinkers 
had addressed social concerns and the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum of 
1891 not only affirmed the right to private property, but also noted that 
owners and employers had obligations.85  Nonetheless, the convergence of 
interests between Roman Catholics and the Conservative party led Radicals 
and others to characterize the Catholic position on private property as being 
completely contrary to the social function doctrine.86  Similarly, it is not 
clear that the French concept of the social function of property as developed 
by Duguit and Hayem would necessarily lead to the sweeping reforms 
Radicals had in mind.  Duguit was careful to distance himself from 
socialism and redistributist policies.  He did not adopt an analytical method 
of class struggle.87
In the course of the debates, those advancing reform of the property 
provision of the Constitution of 1833 were not wedded to the conceptual or 
terminological elegance of the phrase “social function” and, in fact, as the 
debates progressed, they abandoned attempts to incorporate this term to 
impose defined limitations on property.  Oyarzún, for example, used the 
term “social function” in his speeches, but later opted for limitations that 
promoted “social utility.”
  Nonetheless, these finer points of the social function 
doctrine and its origins were lost in the politically saturated process of 
constitutional reform. 
88
B.  Opponents of the Social Function of Property 
  Most subcommittee members on the “social” 
side of the fence asserted the descriptive accuracy of property having some 
sort of social limitation or social function.  For them, this assertion did not 
mark a radical departure from reality or from the present state of affairs; the 
constitutional definition had to catch up to what had already happened and 
what could be observed.  This, of course, comported with the observations 
that Duguit and others had made about the shift of property’s 
characterization in the modern world. 
Luis Barros Borgoño advised against any change in the definition of 
property because in his view, the wealth of the country and the stability of 
 
 84. GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, supra note 83, at 152. 
 85. PETER LESTER REICH, MEXICO’S HIDDEN REVOLUTION:  THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
LAW AND POLITICS SINCE 1929, at 148 n.41 (1995); see also BRAHM, supra note 51, at 28–29 
(1999); JAY P. CORRIN, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 73–
76 (2002); CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1891–PRESENT:  A 
HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS 174–79 (2002).  For a contemporary 
discussion of the Church’s view on property and its obligations, see JESÚS PABÓN S. DE 
URBINA, POSITIVISMO Y PROPIEDAD:  ESTUDIO SOBRE LA IDEA DE PROPIEDAD FUNCIÓN SOCIAL 
75–94 (1925). 
 86. GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, supra note 83, at 152. 
 87. Mirow, supra note 4, at 211. 
 88. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 86, 93. 
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foreign investment were tied directly to a stable property regime.89  This 
was the only way to avoid the capital flight that would occur from tinkering 
with definitions of property on the constitutional level.  Thus, Barros 
Borgoño put pragmatic economic considerations to the forefront of his 
comments and his resistance to changing the constitution.90  Furthermore, 
in his view, steps towards dividing large farms and selling parcels to small 
farmers could be accomplished without changes to the constitutional text.91
Agreeing with Barros Borgoño that the language of the Constitution of 
1833 should not be touched on the topic of property, subcommittee member 
Romualdo Silva Cortés directly rejected any notion of property as a social 
function, instead asserting that property was “a natural right . . . an 
extension of human personality.”
 
92  For him, the definition of property as 
found in the Constitution of 1833 was of the highest importance to the 
country.  To play with it would lead to a litany of uncertainty in industry, 
agriculture, and investment.93  Nonetheless, later in the debates, Silva 
Cortés expanded on his original position.  While he insisted on keeping the 
original language of the Constitution of 1833, he also wanted to make 
additions that addressed various broad social aspects.94  Joined by 
Francisco Vidal Garcés, Silva Cortés suggested draft language that would 
ensure the protection of work, health, minimum wage, necessary rest, 
compensation for injured workers, peaceful resolution of labor disputes, the 
creation of economic and hygienic housing, and the security of each 
person’s life, morality, and education.95  Echoing Barros Borgoño, Vidal 
Garcés indicated that redistribution of the latifundios by the state had 
already occurred under the language holding property inviolable in the 
Constitution of 1833, and therefore increasing the number of small farm 
owners did not depend on redefining property in the constitution.96
Eliodoro Yáñez agreed with Silva Cortés that property could not be a 
social function because it was a natural right.
 
97  His argument was 
grounded in the Roman law of dominion, a view of property in his view 
worthy to be enshrined in the Constitution.98  Yáñez, however, noted that 
the concept of a Roman owner’s right to “use and abuse” property had been 
modified by modern legislation such as the Chilean Civil Code’s 
requirement that the exercise of property rights comport with existing law 
and the rights of others.99
 
 89. See id. at 88. 
  Yáñez also rejected the idea that England could 
serve as a model.  Any parallel to England was illusory because of the 
differences between Chile and England in capital, production, and 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 103–04. 
 92. Id. at 88. 
 93. Id. at 88–89. 
 94. Id. at 105–06. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 113. 
 97. See id. at 90–91. 
 98. See id. at 98–99. 
 99. Id.; see also supra notes 45–46, 77 and accompanying text. 
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transportation.100  Furthermore, the free market (“libre juego de las leyes 
económicas”) and increases in work and production were the best way to 
stimulate the cultivation of land.101  Yáñez’s proposed language provided 
for the inviolability of property, but continued with a limitation, although 
not one evoking the term “social function”:  “The exercise of the right of 
property is subject to the duties that by reason of public utility the laws 
determine.”102
Domingo Amunátegui, another opponent to changing the property 
provision of the constitution, gave the example of Russia, where large 
landed estates had been divided among small farmers as owners without the 
abolition of private property.
 
103  As a result, Russia lost its place as the 
bread basket of Europe and had been replaced by the United States.104  
Amunátequi addressed Guerra’s desire to subdivide latifundios by noting 
that changes intended to increase the distribution of land such as the 
abolition of entails (mayorazgos) and limitations in the Chilean Civil Code 
were possible even under the earlier language of the Constitution of 
1833.105
Pedro N. Montenegro was another opponent to changing the text of the 
constitution.  His objection was milder than that of others who spoke of 
property as a natural right or of the need to maintain foreign investment and 
a growing economy.  Indeed, he seems to have welcomed some of the 
reforms suggested by Guerra concerning the division of lands and 
encouraging more broadly the cultivation of land, but Montenegro did not 
believe that a system of punitive taxes was the way to achieve this.  These 
steps did not require a change in the constitutional language defining 
property.  Concerning parallels to England, a recurring theme, Montenegro 
pointed to factual differences between the countries and concluded that 
“what is good for England may not be for us.”
  Thus, several members believed some form of redistribution of 
agricultural land was possible without changing the constitutional definition 
of property. 
106
In sum, as a counterpoint to the Radical social function view, 
Conservatives sought to maintain the inviolability of an absolute right to 
property.  Some, such as Barros Borgoño, based their arguments in favor of 
leaving property’s constitutional status untouched on pragmatic economic 
concerns.
 
107
 
 100. See ACTAS, supra note 
  Others, such as Silva Cortés, were girded by a philosophical 
conception of natural property rights.  Finally, other members held steadfast 
2, at 91, 97. 
 101. Id. at 97. 
 102. “El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad, está sujeto a los deberes que por razón de 
utilidad pública las leyes señalen.” Id. at 100. 
 103. See id. at 92. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 96.  For the abolition of mayorazgos in Chile and possible conflicts with 
absolutist concepts of property, see Mirow, supra note 45, at 316–21. 
 106. “[L]o que en Inglaterra es bueno, puede no serlo entre nosotros.” ACTAS, supra note 
2, at 100. 
 107. Id. at 88. 
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in their desire to maintain the property provision of the Constitution of 1833 
as it stood without making the particular underpinnings clear. 
C.  Middle Positions on the Social Function of Property 
Guillermo Edwards Matte sought a definition that would both maintain 
the inviolability of property and establish duties on owners.  Apparently 
seeking to harmonize positions, he stated that adopting a definition of 
property that included “social function” would lead to confusion.108  
Edwards Matte observed agreement in the course of the debates on the idea 
of the inviolability of property as well as agreement on the idea that the 
right of property imposes some duties towards society.109  Thus, Edwards 
Matte saw Silva Cortés’s proposal as an acceptable compromise.110  
Edwards Matte was also strongly influenced by the examples of other South 
American countries he perceived to be of similar levels of progress to Chile.  
He quoted the recent legislation from Entre Ríos, Argentina, and the 
Constitution of Uruguay of 1917, noting their characterizations of property 
as either “inviolable” or “sacred and inviolable.”111
Combining these absolute views of property, Yáñez’s language, and his 
own drafting, Edwards Matte produced another formulation for 
consideration.  His text begins with the constitutional protection of the 
inviolability of property with unremarkable provisions concerning takings 
for a public use with prior compensation.
 
112
 
 108. Id. at 91–92. 
  It continues with some 
compromise between absolute rights in property and a social function:  
 109. Id. at 108. 
 110. Id. at 108–09. 
 111. Id. at 109. 
 112. Edwards Matte’s text reads: 
  5.  La inviolabilidad de todas las propiedades. 
  Ninguna persona natural o jurídica podrá ser privada de la de su dominio, ni 
de parte de ella o de su derecho sino en virtud de sentencia judicial, salvo el caso 
en que por razón de utilidad pública, declarada por ley, se resuelva por ésta la 
expropiación, la que se efectuará dándose previamente al dueño la indemnización 
que con él se ajuste o que fijen los Tribunales.  No podrá en caso alguno 
imponerse pena de confiscación de bienes. 
  El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad está sujeto a los deberes que las leyes 
señalen por razón de utilidad pública.  En ese sentido podrán las leyes regular de 
un modo equitativo las relaciones de empleadores y empleados u obreros, velando 
por la solución pacífica de sus conflictos, creando instituciones obligatorias de 
retiro y previsión social, exigiendo razonable indemnización por los accidentes del 
trabajo, cuidando de la salubridad de los talleres de los métodos y horarios de 
labor, estableciendo un régimen justo y prudente de sueldos y salarios mínimos y, 
en general, dictando medidas que faciliten la armonía del capital y el trabajo.  
Podrán también establecer servidumbres legales, prohibir la usura y las industrias 
contrarias a las buenas costumbres y asegurar el cumplimiento del deber que 
corresponde al propietario de cultivar el suelo en conformidad a lo que permitan 
sus condiciones naturales y económicas. 
  El Estado deberá legislar con la finalidad de conseguir la difusión de la 
pequeña propiedad y especialmente, con la de obtener que cada familia chilena 
llegue a poseer una habitación propia y sana. 
Id. at 110–11. 
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“The exercise of the right of property is subject to the duties that the laws 
establish for the purpose of public utility.”113  Edwards Matte’s text then 
continued with many additional social rights including labor relations, 
social security, workers’ compensation, minimum wages, harmony between 
capital and labor, the required cultivation of land, and safe and individually 
owned housing.114  Many of these social rights reflected legislative goals 
that had not been accomplished during Alessandri’s first term.115  Indeed, 
goals such as providing security for workers through minimum pensions 
and housing were based on a notion of property that went far beyond the 
ideas of the social function of property as set out by Duguit and of 
redistributing land through agrarian reform.116  Aspects of “social property” 
were also to find expression in the final text of the constitution.117
Concerning a right to housing, Edwards Matte indicated that he was 
influenced by the German Constitution.
 
118  Oyarzún, who supported the 
idea of the social function doctrine, but rejected the debate over the term as 
semantic quibbling, supported Edwards’s proposal, perhaps because it got 
to the substance of social reform while sidestepping the definitional issue of 
the exact nature of property under the constitution.119
Another member of the subcommittee, Héctor Zañartu, called for a clear 
definition without indicating his preference on the question of the social 
function.  His call for precision was placed in the context of structural 
governmental functions because another portion of the new constitution 
would require a supreme court to determine the constitutionality of 
statutes.
 
120  This concern had also been raised by Guerra.121
D.  Alessandri Invokes Duguit 
 
On the first day of debates, President Alessandri attempted to build some 
consensus by suggesting that there was general agreement on the inviolable 
nature of property as reflected in the text of the Constitution of 1833.  
Nonetheless, Alessandri also saw some room for establishing limitations on 
property that reflected the social good.  His examples of this social good 
were restricted to the sort of narrow limitations that already existed under 
established Chilean law, such as expropriation for public use and servitudes 
under the civil law.  He chose not to address latifundios and uncultivated 
land, the main areas referred to by those speaking before him.122
 
 113. “El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad está sujeto a los deberes que las leyes 
señalen por razón de utilidad pública.” Id. 
  Even if 
there seemed to be some consensus on limiting property, the exact path to 
new language was difficult to navigate as it wandered through the various 
 114. Id. at 111. 
 115. Stanton, supra note 20, at 4. 
 116. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 118. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 112. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 92. 
 121. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 122. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 89–90. 
2011] THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY IN CHILE 1201 
proposals of the subcommittee members.123
On the third day of full debate, Alessandri attempted to find agreement 
on certain areas.  Noting the uneasiness of some members when debating 
the right of property, Alessandri offered calming words from an unlikely 
source: 
  Then, for several days, 
Alessandri appears to have sat quietly listening to the debates without 
offering more guidance on the topic. 
 To diminish a little the fears that some feel when the right of property 
is treated, please permit me to read some paragraphs of a text of 
Constitutional Law written by Léon Duguit, Dean of the Law Faculty of 
the University of Bordeaux, an author who is considered in Europe the 
leading authority on questions of Constitutional Law.124
Alessandri quoted Duguit on the French Revolution and its unthinking 
adoption of an inviolable right to private property that flowed from the 
desire of the members of the Constituent and Convention to guarantee their 
interests in property as members of the bourgeois class.
 
125  Duguit then 
recounted the French Constitution of 1848’s enshrinement of a natural right 
theory of property.126  From here, Alessandri, quoting Duguit, noted that 
the quality of property in modern society had changed:  “Immovable 
property, capitalistic and inheritable, cannot be explained except by its 
social utility; and it will not be able to demonstrate that it is legitimate 
without at the same time demonstrating that at a certain point it is socially 
useful.”127
 Property is not an untouchable and sacred right, but rather a right that 
is constantly evolving and that ought to adapt itself to the social 
necessities to which it responds. 
  These observations led Alessandri to quote even more from 
Duguit’s passages regarding the nature of property in modern society: 
 . . . . 
 One may say that in fact the concept of property as a subjective right 
disappears, to be replaced by the concept of property as a social 
function.128
 
 123. BRAHM, supra note 
 
51, at 50. 
 124. The Spanish language version reads as follows: 
  Para ir disipando un poco los temores que algunos sienten cuando se trata del 
derecho de propiedad, se va a permitir leer algunos párrafos de un texto de 
Derecho Constitucional escrito por León Duguit, Decano de la Facultad de 
Derecho de la Universidad de Burdeos, autor que es considerado en Europa como 
la primera autoridad en cuestiones de Derecho Constitucional. 
ACTAS, supra note 2, at 114. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 115. 
 127. “La propiedad inmueble, capitalista y hereditaria no puede explicarse más que por 
su utilidad social; y no se habrá demostrado que es legítima, si no se demuestra al mismo 
tiempo que en una época determinada es socialmente útil.” Id. 
 128. The Spanish language version reads: 
  La propiedad no es un derecho intangible y sagrado, sino un derecho que está 
continuamente evolucionando y que debe adaptarse a las necesidades sociales a 
que responde. 
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Having extensively quoted his European expert, Alessandri continued 
with his own gloss on Duguit’s work.  Alessandri asserted that this was an 
opportune moment to follow science and the modern world by modernizing 
the constitution according to scientific principles.  In his and Duguit’s view, 
the inviolability of property had to give way to the legal reality (la verdad 
jurídica) of property with limitations.129  According to Alessandri, these 
changes were necessary to provide an accurate description of property in 
light of the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review of legislative acts and 
in light of the just limitations that may now be placed on property 
considering the “state in which the right of property finds itself today.”130  
Greatly in favor of the draft changes proposed by Yáñez and by Edwards 
Matte, Alessandri’s country in his view had a pivotal opportunity to “adjust 
the right of property to the reality of things, to modernize the Constitution a 
bit,” and to unite Chileans.131
There was little doubt where Alessandri stood on the issue.  Alessandri 
sought reform.  After Alessandri spoke, it was agreed that a drafting 
commission composed of Alessandri and his former opponent for the 
presidential nomination, Barros Borgoño, would undertake the preparation 
of a text for consideration.
 
132
The day after being appointed to the drafting commission, Alessandri 
returned with a draft.
  Alessandri sought a drafting partner who 
would represent the more conservative thinkers on property and who would 
be flexible on the matter.  His selection of Barros Borgoño cleverly fulfilled 
these needs.  A deeply held philosophical belief about the nature of 
property, such as that held by Silva Cortés, could not be so easily subjected 
to the political demands of the moment, but Barros Borgoño’s pragmatic 
approach could be won over. 
133
 
  . . . . 
  It was, in Alessandri’s words, the exclusive work 
  Se puede decir que en el hecho el concepto de la propiedad como derecho 
subjetivo desaparece, para ser reemplazado por el concepto de la propiedad como 
función social. 
Id. at 115–16. 
 129. See id. at 116. 
 130. “[E]l estado en que el derecho de propiedad se halla hoy día . . . .” Id. at 117. 
 131. “[A]justar el derecho de propiedad a la realidad de las cosas, modernizando un 
poco la Constitución . . . .” Id. at 117–18. 
 132. Id. at 118. 
 133. Alessandri’s draft reads: 
  Artículo . . .  La Constitución asegura a todos los habitantes de la República: 
  5. La inviolabilidad de todas las propiedades sin distinción alguna. 
  Nadie puede ser privado de la de su dominio ni de una parte de ella o del 
derecho que a ella tuviera sino en virtud de sentencia judicial o de expropiación 
por razón de utilidad pública, calificada por una ley.  En este caso, se dará 
previamente al dueño la indemnización que se ajuste con él o que se determine en 
el juicio correspondiente. 
  El ejercicio del derecho de propiedad está sometido a las limitaciones o reglas 
que exijen el mantenimiento y el progreso del orden social. 
  En tal sentido podrá la ley imponerle obligaciones o servidumbres de utilidad 
pública en favor de los intereses generales del Estado, de la salud de los 
ciudadanos y de la salubridad pública. 
  . . . . 
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of Barros Borgoño.134  Alessandri said that his participation was merely to 
accept everything Barros Borgoño suggested.135  The draft had achieved the 
goal of defining “with clarity and precision the modern scientific concept of 
property.”136  While maintaining the inviolability of property and the 
expropriation for public use with prior indemnification, the draft added new 
language responding to the social function norm without stating the 
contested words “social function.”137  The new constitutional definition of 
property was expressed this way:  “The exercise of the right of property is 
subject to the limitations or rules that the maintenance and progress of the 
social order require.”138  Thus, Alessandri sought to assure the assembly 
that he only wanted to limit, and not to attack, the right of property.139
Barros Borgoño commented after presenting the draft that the 
inviolability of property was maintained and his examples of limitations on 
property under the new text, such as limitations under the Civil Code or for 
servitudes under public law, were quite narrowly construed.
 
140  For Barros 
Borgoño, there was no mention of latifundios or uncultivated land, clearly 
indicating that the constitutional text had reached a quiet and momentary 
truce on these pressing issues.  Stating that the language did nothing more 
than reflect the present state of social evolution, Alessandri also construed 
these provisions to address a situation of particular shortage or national 
need, such as gasoline.141
The proposed language now formed a new focal point for discussion and 
all involved in the debate stepped forward to voice their views.  Edwards 
Matte returned to the theme of ensuring that the constitution was clear in 
light of the new responsibilities of the Supreme Court to determine the 
constitutionality of legislation, and he provisionally approved the draft.
 
142
As one might have expected, Hidalgo objected that the proposed 
language did not go nearly far enough.
 
143
 
  6.  La protección al trabajo y a las obras de previsión social, especialmente en 
cuanto se refieren a la habitación sana y a las condiciones económicas de la vida 
en forma de proporcionar a cada ciudadano un mínimun de bienestar, adecuado a 
la satisfacción de sus necesidades personales y a las de sus familias.  La ley 
regulará esta organización. 
  Silva Cortés and Vidal Garcés 
were apparently satisfied that the draft had at least kept the inviolability of 
Id. at 121–22 (first omission in original).  Later in the drafting process, the second and third 
paragraphs of section 5 were joined and section 6 was moved to a position in Article 10 
where it followed the constitutional protections of intellectual property, the home, and 
correspondence. Id. at 135–36, 138; see CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE 
(1925) art. 10(10)–(14). 
 134. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 121. 
 135. Id. 
 136. “[C]on claridad y precisión el concepto científico moderno de la propiedad.” Id. 
 137. Id. at 121–22. 
 138. Id. at 121. 
 139. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 46. 
 140. ACTAS, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
 141. Id. at 123. 
 142. Id. at 124–25, 127. 
 143. See id. at 125–26. 
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property and approved the text.144  Yáñez made a structural argument in 
opposition to the draft, arguing that the constitution should provide the 
structure and institutional balance of government.145  He argued that 
defining exactly what property was, beyond its inviolability, should be in 
the hands of legislators.146  To this argument, Alessandri responded that it 
was difficult to see where the right of property ends and the economic and 
social aspects of public law begin; they were related and needed to be 
addressed together.147
Edwards Matte agreed with Alessandri that there was no clear line, and 
he expressed concern that without establishing clear boundaries on the 
legislative power to limit property rights, broad language in the constitution 
would go beyond what all appeared to agree on:  labor legislation, an 
existing regime of servitudes, prohibiting usury, and creating a duty to 
cultivate land.
 
148
 The sensitive disagreement in which one is found with Mr. Edwards 
Matte and, in part, with the proposition read in this session, is due to that 
it is thought, by this way, limitations are placed on future congresses, 
thinking of the fear that in them Marxist or Communist tendencies may 
come to dominate.  But for his part he thinks that if such thing occurs, if 
the country organizes its public powers on this base and adopts this 
regime, the Constitution itself will be a dead letter and nothing established 
today will be considered.
  Focusing still on the inviolability of property, Yáñez got 
right to the heart of the matter when addressing the types of limitations on 
property permitted under the constitution: 
149
Yáñez asserted that Edwards Matte was opening the door to the very 
tendencies he hoped to avoid.
 
150  Other members commented on minor 
points and concerns.  Alessandri and Barros Borgoño responded with 
substantive debate on Article 10(5) and its definition of property, evidently 
ending the debate on May 26, 1925.151  The portions of Article 10 
addressing property were later approved without modification on July 7, 
1925.152
 
 144. Id. at 127–28. 
  There were a few subsequent unsuccessful attempts to substitute 
language in the draft, and some final technical questions of numbering and 
 145. Id. at 128–30. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 130. 
 148. See id. at 131. 
 149. The Spanish language text reads: 
  El sensible desacuerdo en que se encuentra con el señor Edwards Matte y, en 
parte, con la proposición leída en esta sesión, es debido a que se cree que de ese 
modo se ponen limitaciones a los futuros Congresos, ante el temor de que en ellos 
puedan llegar a dominar tendencias marxistas o comunistas.  Pero por su parte 
piensa que si tal cosa ocurre, si el país organiza sus poderes públicos sobre esa 
base y adopta ese régimen, la Constitución misma sería letra muerta y nada de lo 
que hoy se establezca sería considerado. 
Id. at 134. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 136–37. 
 152. Id. at 337. 
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of exact location and order of the text.153  The draft was submitted to a 
national plebiscite on August 30, and was promulgated on September 18, 
1925.154
 Article 10.  The Constitution assures all inhabitants of the Republic: 
  The final version included in the Constitution of 1925 read: 
 . . . . 
 (10) The inviolability of all property without any distinction. 
 No one may be deprived of the property of his dominion, or any part 
thereof, or of the right to which he has, unless by virtue of judicial 
sentence or of expropriation for reason of public utility, described by law.  
In this case, prior indemnification shall be paid to the owner that he 
agrees to or that is determined by corresponding judgment. 
 The exercise of the right of property is subject to the limitations or 
rules that the maintenance of the progress of the social order require, and 
in this sense, law may impose on it obligations or servitudes of public 
utility in favor of the general interests of the State, of the health of citizens 
and of the public well-being . . . .155
 The first section maintains the language of the Constitution of 1833 and 
the theory of property as an inviolable or absolute right.  The next sections 
incorporate the social function doctrine, without, however, mentioning the 
term “social function” itself.  Thus, in conscious self-conflict, the provision 
maintains two disparate concepts of property in the same text.  
Conservatives got their language; Radicals got theirs.  Nonetheless, as the 
debates leading to the text and the text itself reveal, a social function 
definition of property had gained a beachhead in an established land of 
absolute property rights.  Ideas of duty and obligation to the state and to 
society were now found in the constitution itself.  For the future of property 
in Chile, both in terms of terminology and ideology, a purely absolutist 
liberal concept of property had been rejected.  Although a right, property 
was now clearly a limited right and, of course, anything other than an 
unyielding line on the absolute right of property meant that the battle to 
continue the liberal absolute construction of property had been lost.
 
156
III.  THE LEGACY OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY IN CHILE 
  The 
only question left would be how far the limitations on property would run 
and, even though the term “social function” was not incorporated into the 
constitutional text, future debates on the nature of property in Chile would 
appeal to and expand the social function construction of property. 
The idea of property yielding to social obligations had been established.  
With the new definition of property in the constitution, lawyers and 
politicians worked to shape their particular interpretation of the language.  
 
 153. Id. at 480–82; BRAHM, supra note 51, at 42. 
 154. Stanton, supra note 20, at 5, 22. 
 155. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE (1925) art. 10(10).  For the 
Spanish text, see supra note 10. 
 156. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 44, 52. 
1206 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
The trajectory for the next nearly fifty years would be the gradual expansion 
and remolding of limitations on property, often done under the broadly 
accepted principles of the social function norm.  Later politicians and 
legislators read the language of limitation found in the property provision of 
the Constitution of 1925 as a social function norm that would be 
aggressively expanded under President Allende to a policy of state 
ownership of property and socialism until General Augusto Pinochet’s coup 
on September 11, 1973.157
In his study of reforms in the Constitution of 1925, Radical Socialist 
Pedro Eduardo González García noted several places where the new 
constitution adopted a social function definition of property as developed 
by Auguste Comte and Léon Duguit.
 
158  Despite the absence of clear 
language on the question of large estates and uncultivated land, González 
García found that this new view of property provided the basis for 
legislation to limit aspects of ownership.159  He cited, for example, a law of 
1926 incrementally taxing undeveloped urban property to encourage 
building.160  Nudging the constitutional text towards the political aims of 
his party, González García sought to place the new Chilean conception of 
property into the context of the Russian Soviet Constitution of 1918, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Constitution of 1923, the German 
Constitution of 1918, the Polish Constitution of 1921, and the Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1921.161  González García also took special note of the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917.  Citing the Mexican Constitution’s famous 
Article 27, he characterized the document as the only other American 
constitution that adopted a social function definition of property.162
The contemplated structures of the Constitution of 1925 were not long-
lived.  In October 1925, Colonel Carlos Ibáñez, who had been an important 
figure in the second coup restoring Alessandri, forced Alessandri’s 
resignation.
  Thus, 
González García sought to place the Chilean Constitution within the group 
of constitutions that sought to limit property substantially.  He also asserted 
that the language of the Constitution of 1925 was sufficient to bring about 
the land reforms central to his party’s platform. 
163  In 1927, Ibáñez, then Minister of Interior, imposed military 
control over the government and forced President Emilio Figueroa, 
Alessandri’s successor, to resign.164 Colonel Ibáñez succeeded Figuero 
through a plebiscite.165
 
 157. See id. at 261–62. 
  Following the social function interpretation of the 
property provision of the Constitution of 1925, legislation that would have 
been unheard of under the absolutist position of the Constitution of 1833 
 158. GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, supra note 83, at 145, 147, 149–51, 161, 163.  For Comte, see 
Mirow, supra note 4, at 202. 
 159. GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA, supra note 83, at 164–65. 
 160. Id. at 164. 
 161. Id. at 141, 142, 166, 167. 
 162. Id. at 167. 
 163. RECTOR, supra note 12, at 148. 
 164. Id.; Stanton, supra note 20, at 5. 
 165. RECTOR, supra note 12, at 148; Stanton, supra note 20, at 5. 
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was now possible.  From the late 1920s and during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, Ibáñez’s government, the middle class, and the army advanced 
social projects that implicated a view of the social function of property.166  
Enrique Brahm Garciá has noted a number of these activities.  First, there 
were “colonization” projects, effected through the Ministry of Southern 
Property, for acquiring and distributing land in the vast and sparsely 
populated southern areas of Aysén and Magallanes.  These projects required 
owners to build on and exploit the land allotted to them.167  Ibáñez also 
sought an increase in expropriations through the Board of Agricultural 
Colonization (Caja de Colonización Agrícola).168  Second, the social 
function norm also provided a basis for the creation of statutes regulating 
urban construction and development.169  Third, laws creating utility 
easements and public rights of way for roads and sewers grew to encroach 
on the private property of Chileans to advance the common good.170  
Fourth, taxes and price fixing both allocated resources in the market and 
concretized policy goals.171  Fifth, bolstering Ibáñez’s interventionist 
approach to the economy, ministries and departments of the government 
fostered protectionism and the development of industry.172
In 1932, Chile entered a short-lived “Socialist Republic” under Air Force 
Commander Marmaduke Grove.  For our purposes, this period of several 
months was not so important for its shift in government, but rather for the 
legislation it produced.  Laws established during this period would have a 
lasting effect in the decades to come.
  These 
undertakings were all based on the new social function definition of 
property. 
173  After two months of laws 
advancing state control and planning towards socialism, the “Socialist 
Republic” came under the guidance of Carlos Dávila.174  Dávila moved 
forward with a program of the “socialization of property,” which included 
expropriation, subdivision, and collective exploitation of land through the 
Board of Agricultural Colonization.175  Regulations touched staples such as 
wheat, flour, and bread and brought mining under state control.176
 
 166. BRAHM, supra note 
  Perhaps 
the most lasting institution of this short-lived period was the creation of a 
General Commissary of Livelihood and Prices (Comisariato General de 
Subsistencias y Precios) under the Ministry of Work that continued to 
control many aspects of economic life, including the production, 
manufacturing, importation, exportation, distribution, and transportation of 
51, at 68. 
 167. Id. at 69–70. 
 168. Id. at 82–85. 
 169. Id. at 72–75. 
 170. Id. at 75–77. 
 171. Id. at 77–78, 80–82. 
 172. Id. at 78–80. 
 173. Id. at 87–91; COLLIER & SATER, supra note 15, at 222–26. 
 174. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 90. 
 175. Id. at 92.  The Board stopped its activities in 1962 and had settled about 4,000 
families during its existence. Thome, supra note 5, at 209. 
 176. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 94–95. 
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necessary goods in Chile until the early 1970s.177  Dávila and the “Socialist 
Republic” fell on September 12, 1932, but their legislation was to be dusted 
off frequently over the next forty years in relation to the socialization of 
property.178  The forceful socialist agenda of Dávila was followed by a 
more moderate second presidency of Arturo Alessandri, who continued the 
General Commissary, supported industry, and advanced a program of 
agrarian reform rooted in in the property provision of the Constitution of 
1925.179
After Alessandri’s second presidency, Chile’s policy on property was 
guided by the Radical party, which maintained control from 1938 to 
1952.
 
180  Private property was linked to the evils of capitalism and slated 
for substantial reformation.  Mining, agriculture, industry, and commerce 
were all subject to additional scrutiny, particularly under the Consejo de la 
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, charged with planning the 
Chilean economy.181  Laws and institutions of the “Socialist Republic” 
were invoked in the process.182  With reinterpretations of the constitutional 
property provision as a foundation, a law from this period enacted in 1944 
would later form the basis for an even farther reaching agrarian reform 
program.183  Indeed, Briones’s attacks on latifundios and uncultivated land 
in 1925 continued to have voice in the 1950s with calls in draft legislation 
to replace latifundios with mid-sized properties and to transform the Board 
of Agricultural Colonization into a “true Institute of Agrarian Reform.”184
Beginning in 1952, the second government of Carlos Ibáñez brought 
heightened statist control of all aspects of the economy built on the 
structures in place from the “Socialist Republic.”  These efforts included 
price controls, new taxation regimes, expropriations, and attempts to reduce 
the payments for expropriated property.
 
185  The new compensation schemes 
were so aggressive they failed constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme 
Court.186
Despite such setbacks, property had been recharacterized sufficiently to 
permit sweeping legislation that limited its exercise according to the 
dictates of the state.  Although the Constitution of 1925 did not adopt the 
term “social function” in relation to property, posterity read this concept 
into the language of Article 10(10).  This led to proposals to limit large 
landed estates, to ensure the exploitation of agricultural lands, and to direct 
urban development.  The social function norm of property had won the day.  
As examples, Enrique Evans notes acts and codes on water, urbanization in 
 
 
 177. Decreto Ley No. 520, Agosto 30, 1932, DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); BRAHM, 
supra note 51, at 95–96. 
 178. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 97. 
 179. Id. at 99–105. 
 180. Id. at 107–09. 
 181. Id. at 109. 
 182. See id. at 112–15. 
 183. Id. at 116. 
 184. Id. at 122. 
 185. Id. at 123–35. 
 186. Id. at 134. 
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cities, railroads, roads, electrical services, aviation, and the important law of 
agrarian reform of 1963.187  Indeed, Chile’s constitutional provision on 
property was amended in 1963 to provide sweeping agrarian reform of rural 
lands with a system of indemnification that was greatly favorable to 
carrying out such reforms.188  The reforms were enacted under President 
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, President Arturo Alessandri’s son.189
The 1960s proved to be a particularly active decade for agrarian 
reform.
 
190  Although characterized by a liberal tendency, Jorge Alessandri’s 
presidency brought forth a substantial plan for agrarian reform.191  At the 
time, it was estimated that over one half of all the private land in Chile was 
owned by 375 families in latifundias.192  The law, yet again, asserted a 
limited conception of property, particularly agricultural property, under an 
attendant theory of property’s social function.  Thus, agricultural property 
was obligated to be cultivated.193  Compensation for expropriation was to 
be made over time and land was to be worked directly by the owner.194  
The state was to take the lead in controlling, planning, and creating 
institutions to bring about this change.195  As might be expected, the regime 
for expropriation and methods of compensation to owners was the most 
difficult to establish and there were various proposals to loosen the 
constraints of Article 10(10) of the Constitution of 1925.196  The required 
constitutional changes would come some five years later, in 1967.197
The eventual success of these changes flowed from a confluence of 
interests, on both international and institutional levels.  Land reform was no 
longer just a part of the agenda of the Radical party.  In the early 1960s, 
President Kennedy and Alliance for Progress pushed for land reform in 
Chile to ameliorate what was still a greatly unbalanced distribution of land 
in the country.
 
198  The Charter of Punta del Este established land reform as 
one of the linchpins of institutional and economic reform in the region.199
 
 187. EVANS, supra note 
  
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), 
under the direction of Raúl Prebisch, and the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization both supported such undertakings on the 
37, at 25–26. 
 188. Id. at 26–27. 
 189. Id. at 27; ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM IN CHILE, 1950–
1970, at 45–76 (1972). 
 190. KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 4–5. 
 191. Ley No. 15020, Noviembre 15, 1962, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); BRAHM, supra 
note 51, at 144.  This law eliminated the Board of Agricultural Colonization and replaced it 
with two institutions guiding agrarian reform until 1973:  the Corporación de Reforma 
Agraria (CORA) and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agropeucario (INDAP). Thome, supra note 
5, at 209–10. 
 192. Note and Comment, The Chilean Land Reform:  A Laboratory for Alliance-for-
Progress Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 310, 312 (1963) [hereinafter The Chilean Land Reform]. 
 193. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 144–45. 
 194. Id. at 148–49. 
 195. Id. at 146–47. 
 196. Id. at 172–77. 
 197. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 198. The Chilean Land Reform, supra note 192, at 312. 
 199. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 157. 
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international plane.200  The church, which Chileans have historically 
associated with the Conservative party and an absolutist, natural-rights 
based conception of property, now called for land reform as part of a newly 
expressed social mission.201
We believe in the social function of land.  The Conservative Party, 
inspired by the social doctrine of the Church, expressed through the 
Encyclicals “Rerum Novarum,”  “Quadragesimo Anno,” and “Mater et 
Magistra,” the base and foundation of its program, has not been able to 
stay away from this legal initiative of urgent necessity . . . .
  In fact, even the Conservative party 
recognized it had to accommodate land reform, as Enrique Brahm García 
quotes Fernando Ochagavía in the debates of the new legislation: 
202
Thus, by the 1960s, the social function of property was no longer an issue 
for debate; it was an accepted view of the place of property in the Chilean 
legal framework.
 
203  The theoretical underpinning for agrarian reform was 
the social function of property, the social function of land, and the social 
obligation that property carried with it.204  This was particularly true for 
agricultural land, which was “subject to the limitations that national 
economic development and in general the maintenance and progress of the 
social order require.”205  Nonetheless, Jorge Alessandri, like his father 
approximately forty years earlier, saw himself walking a difficult line to 
harmonize and to incorporate “the concepts of property as an exclusive 
right and of property as a social function.”206
Rural or agricultural property constitute a social function whose exercise 
remains subject to the obligations of cultivating it, conserving its fertility 
and increasing its production in accordance with the advances of 
agricultural techniques.  The owner ought to provide a just distribution of 
the profits of the land between all those who intervene in the process of its 
exploitation.
  Nonetheless, Brahm correctly 
notes that Duguit’s thought was still active in, for example, Article 1 of the 
draft of agrarian reform presented by the Radical party in 1959, which 
reads: 
207
In the mid-1960s, President Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian 
Democrat party turned his attention to obtaining agrarian reform that 
targeted the large estates, and would dramatically increase individual 
ownership by those working their own land.
 
208
 
 200. Id. at 154–55. 
  The legal theory of 
property behind the new law of agrarian reform stayed the same; property 
was subject to social regulation.  Under the new legislation, in addition to 
 201. Id. at 158–65. 
 202. Id. at 165 (omission in original) (quoting Sesiones del Congreso, Camara de 
Diputados [S.C.D.] de 4.7.1962, at 1408). 
 203. See id. at 202. 
 204. Id. at 167. 
 205. Id. at 166 (quoting S.C.D. de 29.5.1962, at 12). 
 206. Id. (quoting Mensaje de S.E. El Presidente de la República Don Jorge Alessandri 
Rodriguez de 21 de Mayo de 1962, at 287). 
 207. Id. at 168 (quoting S.C.D. de 14.9.1959, at 3988). 
 208. Id. at 179–81; KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 79–144; Thome, supra note 5, at 210. 
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poor exploitation of land, the mere expanse of one tract of land under one 
owner was enough to merit expropriation and, indeed, almost all agrarian 
land became subject to expropriation under one or another provision of the 
new law.209  The legislation set its sights on both latifundias and 
minifundias, smaller tracts of land in private hands that were not 
economically viable.210  Furthermore, it established an Agrarian Reform 
Corporation (CORA) and a Supreme Council of Agricultural Development 
to undertake the mechanics of redistribution.211  Expropriation became an 
administrative matter, rather than a procedure supervised by the courts.212  
Using a new system of compensation based on bonds and payment over 
time, the state could rapidly expand its acquisition of land through means 
that mirrored outright confiscation.213  The new regime of property and 
land reform meant reforming the constitution, a protracted process of 
intense political debate that led to the successful amendment of the 
constitution in 1967.214  Ancillary legislation provided for the reversal of 
conveyances done in contemplation of the agrarian reform act in order to 
defeat its application, state control of basic resources, state direction of 
commerce, a plan for housing, and a taxation scheme designed to support 
these goals.215
 Property should be maintained and respected.  However, it should be 
socially regulated.  No property rights should be allowed to exist which, 
in their implementation, damage the common well-being and rights of the 
community. . . . 
  Frei’s interpretation of the social function of property 
provided the basis for such regulation: 
 The agrarian reform will guarantee and respect the property rights of 
those persons who meet the social functions these rights demand.  The 
social functions are:  not to have accumulated vast properties, to have 
adhered to the existing social legislation, to have included the peasants in 
the benefits acquired from the land, and to have created conditions of 
stability, justice, and well-being.216
From 1970 to 1973, President Salvador Allende declared socialism as the 
primary structure for his government.
 
217  In Allende’s view, private 
property should be the exception, and the state should hold property as a 
means of production.218
 
 209. Ley No. 16640, Julio 16, 1967, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); BRAHM, supra note 
  Industries were requisitioned, businesses were 
expropriated, and general services were placed under government 
51, at 182–84. 
 210. The Chilean Land Reform, supra note 192, at 318. 
 211. Id. at 315. 
 212. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 186–87. 
 213. Id. at 188–89. 
 214. The constitutional reform is addressed in detail in EVANS, supra note 37. See also 
KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 147–255; Thome, supra note 5, at 210–11. 
 215. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 195–224. 
 216. Thome, supra note 5, at 210 (translating and quoting Eduardo Frei and Hugo 
Trivelli, Mensaje del Ejecutivo al Congreso Proponiendo la Aprobación del Proyecto de Ley 
de Reoforma Agraria, in ANTONIO VODAVONIC, LEY DE REFORMA AGRARIA 13 (1967)). 
 217. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 230–43. 
 218. Id. 
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supervision and control.219  The government began to buy shares of private 
banks to nationalize, de facto, the banking industry.220  Concerning agrarian 
reform, a new law sought to increase peasant ownership and to guard 
estates under forty hectares from expropriation, but there appeared to be 
insufficient popular support immediately to move forward with these 
changes.221  Nonetheless, while expropriations in the late 1960s were 
measured in the 100,000s of hectares on a yearly basis, under Allende, they 
reached the millions of hectares per year.222
Allende and his program of change came to an abrupt end on September 
11, 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet and his fellow military 
commanders launched a coup that would place Chile under Pinochet’s 
control until 1990 when Patricio Aylwin took office as the first elected 
President of Chile in two decades.
 
223  Pinochet immediately set to reverse 
the political and economic direction of the country.  As Brian Loveman 
writes:  “Press censorship, suspension of civil liberties, the fierce repression 
of leading politicians, labor leaders, academics, and other supposed Marxist 
sympathizers merged into a ‘holy war’ against what the military called the 
‘Marxist cancer.’”224
From the perspective of ideas concerning property in Chile, the Pinochet 
dictatorship is famous for its neo-liberal, free-market reforms under the 
external guidance of the “Chicago boys.”
 
225  Nonetheless, Pinochet 
embraced the social function doctrine of property.  On September 11, 1976, 
in Constitutional Act Number 3, Pinochet’s Ministry of Justice sought to 
revise certain rights as expressed in the Constitution of 1925 to “incorporate 
contemporary constitutional doctrine and its international acceptance.”226  
In fact, the preamble to the Decree Law states that one of the factors leading 
to these changes was that “economic and social development ought to be 
based on a clear definition and adequate protection of the right of property 
and its social function.”227
 
 219. Id. 
  Thus, in 1976, Pinochet’s Constitutional Act 
 220. Id. at 253–55. 
 221. Id. at 244–47. 
 222. Id. at 248. 
 223. BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE:  THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM 257, 308 (3d ed. 
2001).  Pinochet continued as commander of the army until 1998 when he became a 
“Senator for Life.” Id. at 325.  During his rule, “disappearances, torture, and murder 
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SATER, supra note 15, at 361.  Abuses are chronicled in 2 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 1993).  He died in 
2006. Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, 91, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at A1. 
 224. LOVEMAN, supra note 223, at 261. 
 225. Id. at 279–85, 291. 
 226. “[I]ncorporar nuevas garantías acordes con la doctrina constitucional 
contemporánea y su consagración internacional . . . .” Preamble para. 3, Decreto Ley No. 
1552, Septiembre 11, 1976, DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 227. “Que el desarrollo económico y social debe fundarse en una clara definición y 
adecuada protección del derecho de propiedad y su función social . . . .” Preamble para. 8, 
Decreto Ley No. 1552, Septiembre 11, 1976, DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
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incorporated the term “social function” into a Chilean constitutional text for 
the first time: 
 The right of property in its varied forms in all classes of corporeal and 
incorporeal property. 
 Only the law may establish the modes of acquiring property, of using, 
enjoying, and disposing of it and the limitations and obligations that allow 
ensuring its social function.  The social function of property includes as 
much as required by the general interests of the State, national security, 
utility and the public well-being, the best use of the sources of productive 
energy for the service of the collective and the elevation of the conditions 
of the common life of inhabitants.228
On October 21, 1980, Decree Law 1150 established a new Constitution 
of Chile that further entrenched many of the political, social, and economic 
goals of General Pinochet.
 
229  The malleability of the social function 
doctrine was not lost on General Pinochet, and the Constitution of 1980 
repeated the same social function definition of property as found in 
Constitutional Act Number 3.230  As in Constitutional Act Number 3 of 
1976, the Constitution of 1980 contains extensive provisions regarding 
expropriation and appropriate compensation, the protection of small 
holdings, and the state’s power to explore and to exploit natural 
resources.231
 
 228. The Spanish language text reads: 
  There is no small degree of irony that the social function 
norm of property found its strongest and most explicit form in the 
constitution of the Chilean leader most aligned with economic liberalism 
and despotic rule.  One would have expected Pinochet’s economic project 
  El derecho de propiedad en sus diversas especies sobre toda clase de bienes 
corporales o incorporales. 
  Sólo la ley puede establecer el modo de adquirir la propiedad, de usar, gozar y 
disponer de ella y las limitaciones y obligaciones que permitan asegurar su 
función social.  La función social de la propiedad comprende cuanto exijan los 
intereses generales del Estado, la seguridad nacional, la utilidad y la salubridad 
públicas, el mejor aprovechamiento de las fuentes de energía productiva para el 
servicio de la colectividad y la elevación de las condiciones de vida del común de 
los habitantes. 
Art. 1(16), Decreto Ley No. 1552, Septiembre 11, 1976, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 229. LOVEMAN, supra note 223, at 290–91. 
 230. The text from the Constitution of 1980 reads: 
  La Constitución asegura a todas las personas: 
  . . . 
  24. — El derecho de propiedad en sus diversas especies sobre toda clase de 
bienes corporales o incorporales. 
  Sólo la ley puede establecer el modo de adquirir la propiedad, de usar, gozar y 
disponer de ella y las limitaciones y obligaciones que deriven de su función social.  
Esta comprende cuanto exijan los intereses generales de la Nación, la seguridad 
nacional, la utilidad y la salubridad públicas y la conservación del patrimonio 
ambiental. 
  Nadie puede, en caso alguno, ser privado de su propiedad, del bien sobre que 
recae o de alguno de los atributos o facultades esenciales del dominio, sino en 
virtud de ley general o especial que autorice la expropiación por causa de utilidad 
pública o de interés nacional, calificada por el legislador. 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] (1980) art. 19(24). 
 231. Id. 
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to point in the direction of a conception of property as an unassailable, 
absolute natural right.  Instead, the language of the Constitution of 1980 
perfectly co-opts the long-standing Chilean tradition of the social function 
of property and defines social function in such terms as to provide for 
almost complete state control over property as may be necessary for the 
goals of General Pinochet.  And Pinochet worked actively to reverse the 
redistribution of land that had occurred in the preceding decades.  Indeed, it 
is estimated that after 1973 only a little more than half the land distributed 
stayed in the hands of those who had received it either cooperatively or 
individually under recent regimes of agrarian reform.232
By 1989, on the eve of democracy’s return to Chile, the constitution 
maintained the concept of the “social function” of property and defined its 
scope this way: 
 
 The right of property in its varied forms in all classes of corporeal and 
incorporeal property. 
 Only the law may establish the modes of acquiring property, of using, 
enjoying, and disposing of it and the limitations and obligations that allow 
ensuring its social function.  The social function of property includes as 
much as required by the general interests of the State, national security, 
utility and the public well-being, and the conservation of the 
environmental patrimony.233
This language and definition governs today.
 
234
Democracy returned to Chile in 1990 with Presidents mostly following 
the neo-liberal model established during the Pinochet era.
 
235  Over the next 
decade, funding for public housing, health care, and education increased 
substantially.236  In the past ten years, claims for land have come from 
Chile’s indigenous population, notably the Mapuche, but there has been 
little inclination to engage in expansive agrarian reform programs.237
CONCLUSION 
 
The writings of Duguit were the primary and almost exclusive source of 
the social function norm of property in Chile during the debates leading to 
the Chilean Constitution of 1925.  On the theoretical level, Duguit’s thought 
was the guide, his work defined the debate, and his terminology provided 
the focal point around which debate travelled.  Although the Constitution of 
1925 did not adopt the term “social function,” its text reflected the idea and 
in this sense it may be considered one of the earliest Latin American 
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constitutions to adopt this new definition of property.  Duguit supplied the 
idea. 
Other foreign models and ideas related to property also touched on the 
debate, but to a much lesser extent.  The second most important foreign 
influence appears to have been England and its social legislation following 
World War I.238  Germany and Russia were also mentioned in passing.239
The lack of references to the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is unexpected 
and runs counter to some established scholarly interpretations of the spread 
of the social function of property in Latin America.  One recent study of the 
growth of the social conception of property in Chile from 1925 to 1973 
notes the influence of the Weimar Constitution, but does not even mention 
Mexico in its introductory pages setting out the main themes.
  
Other anticipated sources for these ideas, such as the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917 or the German Weimar Constitution of 1919, played only a very 
minor or non-existent role in the construction of the social function norm in 
Chile during the 1920s. 
240
Chilean hesitance to invoke the Mexican Constitution may have followed 
from a sense that the Southern Cone’s cultural and legal development was 
more aligned with Europe than with the large Spanish-speaking country to 
the north.  Duguit effectively raised this intellectual and cultural connection 
in his lectures in Argentina.
  Thus, the 
place of Mexican thought and the Mexican Constitution of 1917 in relation 
to the dissemination of the social function doctrine of property in Latin 
America must be reassessed. 
241  The years leading up to and following the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917 were hardly a period that would call for 
emulation by other countries.  It was a period of intense civil wars, United 
States military intervention, and political assassinations.242  Indeed, in 
Mexico, “[w]hen Plutarco Calles won the presidential elections in 1924 and 
was inaugurated later that year, the ceremony marked the first time in forty 
years that the office was handed over peacefully from one chief executive to 
the next.”243  Furthermore, by 1925, land reform in Mexico under Article 
27 had “not yet benefited the overwhelming majority of rural Mexicans.”244
 
 238. ACTAS, supra note 
  
It is quite possible that the broad-reaching race and class implications of the 
Mexican Revolution’s formative period, the strong rhetoric of land 
redistribution, and even the milder language of the Constitution of 1917 
made the Mexican Constitution a rather distant model for the Chilean 
drafters.  Perhaps the social implications of the Mexican Revolution and its 
constitution were considered too destabilizing for these Chilean politicians 
2, at 86–87, 91, 93, 97, 100–01, 119. 
 239. Id. at 95, 101. 
 240. BRAHM, supra note 51, at 11–32. 
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 242. MICHAEL C. MEYER ET AL., THE COURSE OF MEXICAN HISTORY 493–519 (6th ed. 
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who were drawn to Europe in their search for models.245  Supporting the 
idea that a particular political disposition may affect the willingness to cite 
or not to cite the Mexican Constitution is the study by González García, a 
Radical Socialist, who made connections between the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917 and the Chilean Constitution of 1925.246
Although some members of the subcommittee thought that precise 
labeling of property as a social function or making distinctions between 
“property” and “the exercise of property” were merely semantic quibbles, 
the text as approved actually maintains this distinction.  In this way, the 
constitutional text addresses some of the conceptual problems that had crept 
(and continue to creep) into the discussion of property as a social function.  
Indeed, adopting the phrase “exercise of property” much more closely 
matches the ideas that Duguit must have had in mind.  In the context of 
Duguit’s work, the French “propriété” can be defined as either “ownership” 
or “property.”  As Duguit’s works were translated into Spanish and English, 
“el ejercicio del derecho de propiedad” and “ownership” would have made 
more sense, but translators were drawn to the word “propiedad” and 
“property” instead.  “Ownership” is, of course, “the exercise of property,” 
and thus, this formulation seems truer to Duguit’s intent.
 
247
With President Allende, the history of the idea of private property had 
reached the left side of the continuum.  In the course of Chilean 
constitutional history, private property had been:  (1) an absolute, natural 
right; (2) a right limited by obligations; (3) a social function; and (4) under 
Allende, a basic pillar of the capitalist structure to be dismantled.
 
248
Duguit would have been even more surprised by Pinochet’s willing 
adoption of the term “social function” in the Constitution of 1980.  
Nonetheless, by carefully designing what constituted a social function, 
  While 
the text of the Constitution of 1925 speaks of property limited by particular 
obligations and never uses the term “social function,” Chileans after the 
Constitution of 1925 quickly interpreted the constitution to include the full 
panoply of obligations implied by the social function definition and even 
beyond the ideas set out originally by Duguit.  Although not in the 
Constitution of 1925, the term “social function” was extensively used 
during the debates of the text and afterwards by Chileans attempting to 
define property for various kinds of legislation.  The language of the 
Constitution of 1925 easily permitted the kinds of legislative projects 
sought by those trying to limit large landed estates, uncultivated agricultural 
lands, and undeveloped urban parcels.  It is not clear that Duguit, the main 
proponent of the social function doctrine, would have agreed with all of 
these extensions of the nature of property.  It is clear that Duguit’s writings 
do not support the socialization of property contemplated and advanced by 
President Allende. 
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Pinochet was able to use the ambiguity of the term in his favor, and herein 
lies a telling weakness of the social function doctrine itself.  Allende was 
able to push property’s social function far to the left and Pinochet was able 
to push property’s social function far to the right.  The median position 
once sought by Duguit had been lost even before Allende and Pinochet.  As 
soon as the term “social function” was debated and invoked in relation to 
particular political projects, it was quickly construed beyond its original 
scope.  The original meaning of Duguit’s concept became even more 
obscure as both Allende and Pinochet applied ideas of property to the 
politics of the day. 
 
